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Abstract 
Base rate and conjunction fallacies are consistent biases that influence decision making 
involving probability judgments. We develop simple graphical techniques and test their 
eflcacy in correcting for these biases. Preliminary results suggest that graphical techniques 
help to overcome these biases and improve decision making. We examine the implications of 
incorporating these simple techniques in Executive Information Systems. 
Introduction 
Today, senior executives operate in highly uncertain environments. They have to collect, 
process and analyze a deluge of information - most of it ambiguous. But, their limited 
information acquiring and processing capabilities constrain them in this task [25]. 
Increasingly, executives rely on executive information/support systems for various purposes 
like strategic scanning of their business environments, internal monitoring of their 
businesses, analysis of data available from various internal and external sources, and 
communications [5,19,32]. 
However, executive information systems are, at best, support tools. Executives still 
rely on their mental or cognitive models of their businesses and environments and develop 
heuristics to simplify decision problems [10,16,25]. Specifically, to evaluate compound 
events and conditional probabilities, they tend to use similarity of an event to a relevant 
model (representativeness), ease of recall (availability), and sequential adjustment from an 
initial reference value (anchoring & adjustment) [26]. These simple rules, in turn, bias their 
judgment and result in consistent errors and wrong decisions. 
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Little work has been devoted to debiasing despite the serious impact of biases on 
probability judgments and executive decision making. In this expIoratory study, we strive to 
control the effects of two judgmenta1 errors commonly attributed to representativeness bias: 
the base rate fallacy and the conjunction fallacy [14,29]. Keeping in mind the pervasive 
impact of executive information systems in influencing the mental models of executives 
[21] and the ease of implementation of graphical techniques in such systems, we design 
and test the efficacy of graphical debiasing techniques in correcting for the two fallacies. 
Finally, we examine the implications of our results for EIS and executive decision making. 
Prior Research 
Base Rate Fallacy 
This is the tendency of even mathematically "sophisticated" people to disregard base rates 
(prior probabilities) of events while making conditional probability judgments. This occurs 
when people feel that the base rate infomation is not salient to the decision problem [ZO]. 
People use base rates only when the base rates have a causal connotation to the event [30] 
or when they seem to be more relevant/specific to the event than other given information 
[1,3,9]. Otherwise, only experience and feedback to people over time can prompt routine 
usage of base rates in conditional probability judgments [3]. 
Conjunction Fallacy 
This is a tendency of people to judge the occurrence of a conjunction of two events to be 
more likely than the occurrence of either of those events. People use representativeness of 
an event to a relevant model to assess its probability and because "the representativeness of 
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an event can be increased by specificity, a compound target can be judged more probable 
than one of its components" [29]. People use extensional (consistent with probability 
theory) reasoning only when they are cued by modifying the problem statement to calculate 
relative frequencies of constituent events before estimating that of the conjunction [28]. 
Debiasing 
Debiasing involves nullifying the influence of a bias and improving the quality of 
judgments and decisions. Fischhoff [7] talks of some techniques for debiasing and reviews 
efforts to reduce hindsight bias and overconfidence. 
Fong, Krantz and Nisbett [8] successfully trained subjects to use the law of large 
numbers to solve everyday problems associated with its use. But, statistical training has 
limited application while dealing with complex concepts unless people possess basic 
knowledge of probability theory. 
To  overcome conjunction fallacy, Tversky & Kahneman [28] used different textual 
presentations of the problem statement to cue people along the desired decision path. 
Bar-Hillel (21 and Schocken [24] outline the possible use of graphical representation 
of information to control for base rate fallacy. Their simple graphical methods would 
facilitate debiasing by cueing people to use base rates. However, their suggestions, to our 
knowledge, have not been implemented or empirically tested. 
Graphical Techniques for Debiasing 
Executives make decisions based on relevant information made available to them. The 
complex interaction of task demands, presentation format and decision maker's knowledge 
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influence the final strategy adopted [12,15] and therefore presentation of relevant 
information that controls for biases becomes exceedingly important. 
The importance of information displays for effective decision making [6,11,31] has 
propelled a much research on displays (refer [15]). Information presentation and display 
have important cognitive implications [15,22,27]. Larkin & Simon [17] studied the relative 
merits of three infomationally equivalent representations - propositional, sentential and 
pictorial. They concluded that pictorial representations are computationally more efficient 
i 
because they greatly reduced the cognitive effort to search and solve problems by providing 
salient information simply. 
Specifically, studies indicate that both tabular and graphical presentation formats aid 
decision making whenever congruence exists between task demands and the format used 
[4,12,15,23]. In view of this encouraging support for pictorial representation formats, we 
chose to explore the debiasing capabilities of graphical formats. 
Description of Our Graphical Techniques 
Base rate fallacy (Figure la). We convert probabilities to percentages in the population of 
interest and represent the entire population by a rectangle. Then, we represent base rates by 
shading appropriately scaled portions of this rectangle. Finally, we superimpose likelihood 
to get conditional probability. 
For example in Problem 1 (see Appendix A for problems), the total number of cabs 
in the city is represented by a rectangle. The base rates of Green (15%) and Blue cabs 
(85%) are represented by shading appropriately scaled portions of the rectangle using 
respective colors. Then, the likelihood (reliability of witness = 80%) is superimposed 
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BLUE 
CABS 
F igure  I b .  Conjunct i o n  Probiem 
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(denoted by the darkly shaded portion). Evidently the probability of the witness being 
wrong is greater as the probability that the car was blue is greater than probability that the 
car was green (dark, hatched portion). Also, it is easy to understand conditional 
probabilities as percentages by reading them directly from the graph. 
Conjunction fallacy (Figure Ib). Here, we use Venn diagrams. We represent the entire 
population as a rectangle and denote the populations of interest by circles of different 
colors. Then, we represent conjunction by the overlap of these circles. 
For example in Problem 6, the evenr that Linda is a bank teller and the event that 
she is an activist in the feminist movement are represented respectively by two circles. 
Then, the conjunction - that Linda is both a bank teller and an activist - is denoted by the 
overlap of the two circles (dark, hatched portion). It is immediately evident that the overlap 
between the two circles cannot be greater than either of the circles. Or, the probability of 
occurrence of the conjunction of any two events cannot be greater than the probability of 
occurrence of either constituent event. 
Met hodoIogy 
We conducted experiments with undergraduate business students (who lacked prior exposure 
to probability and statistics) as subjects. Students were informed that the experiment 
involved decision making and that participation was voluntary. No incentive was provided. 
Students were assured that their anonymity would be preserved and their performance in 
these experiments would not affect their grades in any way. 
We used charts to illustrate our graphical techniques. Given the exploratory nature 
of our study, we were wary of making investments in computer displays at this stage. 
Computer displays could be used later in a more rigorous study if results were promising. 
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Figure 2a 
Comparison of Probability Responses 
to Problem 1 (Base Rate) 
PROB. RESPONSES I 
Group 1 (n=26) I 
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Figure 2b. 
Comparison of Probability Responses 
to Problem 1 (Base Rate) 
PROB. RESPONSES 
Group 2 (n=43) 
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We used a one-control-group, one-experimental-group design. Group 1 subjects 
(n=26) served as control and were given two questions in sequence: Problem I, a base rate 
type problem, followed by Problem 2, a conjunction type problem. They were asked to 
answer these questions using their intuition. 
Group 2 subjects (n=43) were given the treatment. First, they were shown our 
graphical technique to solve Problem 3, a base rate problem (see Appendix B for actual 
chart formats). Then, they were given Problem 1 and asked to solve it using the graphical 
technique. Next, they were shown how to solve Problem 4, a conjunction type problem. 
Subsequently, they were asked to solve Problem 2 using the same technique. 
The distribution of probability responses to Problem 1 is summarized in Figures 2a 
& 2b. Group 1 (control) exhibited base rate fallacy with probability estimates close to 80%. 
Also, there were no responses near 4196, the correct value. However, Group 2 subjects 
used base rates better with 21 out of 43 subjects estimating the probability to be between 
35% and-45%. While 12 subjects answered correctly (41%), only 6 still estimated the 
probability as 80%. 
Thus, the use of graphical technique reduced the effect of representativeness bias 
considerably for base rate type problems. 
Responses to Problem 2 are given in Table 1. Surprisingly, both Group 1 and 
Group 2 subjects exhibited conjunction fallacy. Seemingly, our graphical technique had not 
helped overcome conjunction bias. Either the subjects had not found this technique relevant, 
or they had not established the link between the use of the technique to solve Problem 4, a 
simple conjunction type problem, and Problem 2 that is complicated further by 
representativeness considerations. 
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Table 1 
Comparison of Responses to Problem 2 
for Groups 1 & 2 (Conjunction) 
Group 1 Group 2 
(n=26) (n=43) 
Violation 84.5% 86% 
Avg. Rank: 
1) Active in Fern. 2.12 2.02 
movement 
2) Bank Teller 6.54 6.50 
3) Conjunction 5.07 4.84 
Given the encouraging results for base rate fallacy, we figured that the complication 
introduced by representativeness in Problem 2 had prevented subjects from relating our 
uaphical technique as a solution concept for this problem. To test whether this were 
L- 
indeed true, we introduced another stage in our study. 
We used two groups - Group 3 (n=18) and Group 4 (n=47). Group 3 subjects were 
used to replicate Group 2 results with regard to conjunction fallacy. They were given the 
same treatment as Group 2 subjects. Then, they were asked to solve two problems using 
this technique: a simple conjunction type problem, Problem 5 ,  and next Problem 2, a 
conjunction type problem that incorporated representativeness. Given our expectations, 
Group 3 subjects sho~lld have no problem in solving Problem 5 ;  but they should exhibit 
conjunction fallacy in solving Problem 2. 
Group 4 subjects were treated with the use of graphical technique to solve Problem 
6 that involved representativeness. Then, they were asked to solve Problem 2 followed by 
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Problem 5 (order reversed from Group 3). Here, we would expect the subjects' tendency to 
exhibit the conjunction fallacy to decrease considerably in solving both problems. 
Group 3 and Group 4 results are given in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Comparison of Responses to Problems 2 & 5 
for Groups 3 & 4 (Conjunction) 
Group 3 Group 4 
(n= 1 8) (n=47) 
Problem 5 
Violation 17% 17% 
Avg. Rank: 
I) Educated 1.2 1.1 
2) Working 2.06 1.93 
3) Conjunction 2.6 2.7 
Problem 2 
Violation 83 % 25 % 
Avg. Rank: 
I) Active in Fem. 1.83 1.44 
movement 
2) Bank Teller 6.41 6.1 1 
3) Conjunction 4.83 6.40 
As expected, Group 3 results replicated our findings for Group 2. Also, for Group 
4, violations of the conjunction rule for Problem 2 decreased dramatically. This lends 
credence to our view that subjects were unable to relate our graphical technique for a 
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purely conjunction type problem as a means to solve conjunction type problem with 
representativeness considerations. But, when this connection was established by showing the 
subjects the use of this technique for such a problem (Problem 6), they used it effectively 
to arrive at the correct ordering for Problem 2. Thus, we can conclude that our graphical 
technique controls for conjunction bias also. 
Discussion and Implications 
Being an exploratory study, our main intention was to test whether graphical representation 
techniques were useful in controlling for these biases. Results suggest that graphical 
techniques are useful in controlling for representativeness bias while judging conditional 
probabilities and conjunction. Still, results remain to be validated across a larger sample 
consisting of both naive and sophisticated subjects. 
It may be argued that business undergraduate subjects are naive (in the sense that 
they have no experience and exposure to decision making in the business world) and the 
results cannot be generalized to more sophisticated subjects like executives. Yet, even 
sophisticated subjects have been known to exhibit these biases [13,26]. Thus, there is a 
strong basis for applying this study to executives. We would argue that executives who 
have been exposed to pictorial representation in EIS would be more responsive to this 
treatment than "relatively naive" business undergraduate subjects. 
Our exploratory study has only a limited scope. W e  have not ascertained whether 
subjects remember our techniques and use them to solve similar problems with passage of 
time. Also, we have not explored the moderating effects of instruction and learning in 
controlling for biases. These techniques can be implemented on computers and their 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-90-19 
14 
efficacy in controlling for biases can be tested rigorously by generating hypotheses and 
testing them statistically for differences in the quality of responses (accuracy) and the time 
taken to solve real-life problems involving biases. A comprehensive study would require 
the following steps: (1) a pretest to check for biases and to measure decision making time; 
(2) treatment at various levels of support - (a) no support, i-e., neither graphics support nor 
instructions/training (b) only graphics support with no instruction or training (c) only 
instruction/training without graphics support (d) both graphics support and 
instruction/training; (3) a posttest to ascertain efficacy of support in terms of quality and 
quickness of decisions taken and a comparison of results for different levels of support; 
and (4) another posttest after a period for each level of support to check for retention of 
techniques . 
If results support our position, implementation of these underlying ideas in EIS 
using graphical software packages is a simple task. Executives can use this as an option in 
a pull down menu. Thus, these simple decision aids will enable better quality of decisions 
by (1) presenting data in more meaningful formats and increasing their saliency; (2) 
improving analytical and modeling capabilities; and (3) enabling surfacing and testing 
fundamental assumptions and refining existing mental models 1211. These techniques are 
based on simple concepts like Venn diagrams and overlapping bar charts to which an 
executive already has ample exposure and do not require any special training or education. 
Also, graphical techniques can be taught from an earlier stage at low cost in 
schools. Reinforcement of the use of such techniques even at a formative stage, with 
appropriate instruction, will result in their routine usage and a widespread reduction in the 
occurrence of biases across the population. 
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The concepts of probability and statistics can be communicated in a simple way to 
decision makers by using such graphical representation techniques. Recent advances in 
computer graphics and research in information display formats and decision making hold 
great promise. All it needs now is less skepticism and more effort at development, testing 
and implementation of simple techniques in EIS to correct for biases in decision making. 
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Appendix A 
Problem 1: [adapted from 131 
Two cab companies operate in a given city, the Blue and the Green (according to the color 
of the cab they run). Eighty five percent of the cabs are Blue, and the remaining 15% are 
Green. 
A cab was involved in a hit-and-run accident at night. 
A witness later identified the cab as a Green cab. 
The court later tested the witness' ability to distinguish between Blue and Green cabs 
under night time visibility conditions. It found that the witness was able to identify each 
color correctly about 80% of the time, but confused it with the other color about 20% of 
the time. 
1) Do you think the witness was right (Yes/ No)? 
2) Roughly, what do you think are the chances that the errant cab was indeed Green, as 
claimed by the witness? 
Problem 2: [28] 
Given below is the personality sketch of a fictitious individual, Linda, followed by a set of 
occupations and avocations associated with her: 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in Philosophy. As a 
student, she was deeply concerned with the issues of discrimination and social justice, and 
also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. 
1) Linda is a teacher in elementary school. 
2) Linda works in a bookstore and takes Yoga classes. 
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3) Linda is active in feminist movement. 
4) Linda is a psychiatric social worker. 
5 )  Linda is a member of the League of Women Voters. 
6) Linda is a bank teller. 
7) Linda is an insurance salesperson. 
8) Linda is a bank teller and is active in feminist movement. 
Problem 3: [I81 
A certain population of voters are 40% Republican and 60% Democrats. Of these, 70% 
Republicans and 30% Democrats support a certain issue. A person is selected at random. 
She supports the issue. Find the probability that she is a Democrat. 
Problem 4: 
100 students have registered in the Spring of 1989. Each student has taken at least one 
course of the 2 courses offered - Business Policy (BP) and Computers for Management 
(CIM) . 
70 students have taken Business Policy & 60 have taken Computers for Management. How 
many students have taken both? 
Problem 5: 
There is a group of 100 women. All women in this group are either educated or working 
or both. 90  women are educated. 80 women are working. How many women are both 
educated and working? 
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Rank in order the following statements on the number of women. 
1) The number of women who are working; 2) The number of women who are both 
educated and working; 3) The number of women who are educated. ( 1 for maximum and 
3 for minimum ) 
Problem 6: [adapted from 281 
Given below is a description of a person: 
Bill is 34 years old. He is intelligent, but unimaginative, compulsive and generally lifeless. 
In school, he was strong in mathematics but weak in social sciences and humanities. 
Please rank the following statements by their probability: 
I)  Bill is a Sociologist. 
2) Bill is an Accountant. 
3) Bill is a Jazz player. 
4) Bill is an Accountant and a Jazz player. 
5) Bill is an Architect. 
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Appendix B 
Chart Shown to Group 2 for Problem 3: 
Let the rectangle represent the total voters in the given area (Figure 3a). 
As 40% are Republicans and 60% Democrats, let us divide the rectangle in the same 
proportion (Figure 3b). 
We are also given that 70% of the Republicans support the issue and so do 30% of the 
Democrats. Let us represent the number of people that support the issue by a dark region 
(Figure 3c). 
So, the percentage of Democrats who support the issue is .3 x .6 = .18 = 18%. 
And, the percentage of Republicans who support the issue is .4 x .7 = .28 = 28% 
The percentage of the totaI population who support the issue 
= (% of Democrats who support the issue) + (% of Republicans who support the issue) 
= 18% + 28% = 46% 
So, the.probability that the person chosen is a Democrat 
= ((% of Democrats who support the issue) / (% of the total population who support the 
issue)) x 100 
= (18146) x 100 = 39% 
Thus, the probability that the person is a Democrat is less than 50% even though we have 
more Democrats than Republicans. 
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F i g u r e  3b.  
f i g u r e  3c .  
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Chart Shown to Group 2 and Group 3 for Problem 4: 
There are 100 students in a batch. Each student has taken atleast one course. Let this 
figure represent 100 students in the batch (Figure 4a). 
70 students have taken BP (Figure 4b). 
60 students have taken CIM (Figure 4c). 
But, total number of students is 100. So, some have taken both (Figure 4d). 
Therefore, the number of students who have taken both are 
= (70 +60) - 100 = 130 - 100 = 30 
Chart Shown to Group 4 for Problem 6: 
From the given description, Bill can be a Jazz player, an accountant or both. So, we need 
to consider only the following: 
1) the group of all accountants. 
2) the group of all jazz players (Figure 5a). 
Bill can also belong to both groups at the same time (Figure 5b). 
Now, we see the number of people belonging to both groups at the same time (darkly 
shaded region) is less than the number belonging to either group. In other words, the 
chance that Bill belongs to both groups at the same time is less than the chance that he 
belongs to either group. 
So, the ordering will be such that statements 2 & 3 are always ranked before 4. 
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Figure 4 d .  
BUSINESS P O L I C Y  COMPUTERS IN WGMT 
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Figure 5b. 
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